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TAX TREATMENT OF MEALS AND LODGING
FURNISHED TO A PARTNER
Two recent cases, Commissioner v. Doak1 and Commissioner v.
Aloran, 2 decided under the 1939 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE have involved the tax treatment of meals and lodging furnished to a partner
by a partnership.
The facts and reasoning of the cases are essentially the same: Taxpayers, husband and wife, operated a hotel as partners. In the management of the business they found it necessary to maintain a residence
at the hotel and eat their meals there. They deducted the value of these
items from the partnership gross income as a business expense in arriving at net income. Both courts reversed the Tax Court 3 and disallowed the deduction as a personal nondeductible expense.4 Both decisions seem to adopt this reasoning: a partner cannot be considered
an employee of a partnership; the meals and lodging cannot be compensation to the partner; therefore, their value cannot be deducted by the
partnership as compensation paid to an employee. 5 An important concession made by both courts is that if the partnership was treated as
a separate taxable entity and the partners as employees then such
costs might be deductible.
The turning point of the cases then, is whether or not these meals
and lodging can be considered compensation. Whether or not they can
be compensation depends upon the legal concept of a partnership. A
partnership has sometimes been treated as an aggregate of individual
co-owners of property used for a common purpose; at other times
a partnership has been regarded as a single business entity.6 Depending upon which theory is followed a court can come to completely dif1234 F. 2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956).
2 235 F. 2d 595 (8th Cir. 1956). The Doak and Moran cases were approved and
followed by the Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. Briggs, 1956 P-H Fed. Taxes, Par.
73,034 (1956).
3 Commissioner v. Doak, 24 T. C. 569 (1955); Moran v. Commissioner, 1955
(P-H) TC Mem. Dec. Par. 55,202 (1955).
4 INT. REV. CODE §24 (a) (1) (1939) : "In computing net income no deduction
shall in any case be allowed in respect of personal, living, or family expenses,
except extraordinary medical expenses deductible under section 23 (x)." The
1954 CODE section is subtantially the same. See INT. REV. CODE § 262 (1954).
INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a) (1) (A) (1939) : "In computing net income-there
shall be allowed as deductions: In general.-All the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire amount for meals and lodging) while away from home
in the pursuit of a trade or business; and rentals or other payments
required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession,
for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity . . ." The 1954
('ODE section is substantiallv the same. See INT. REV. CODE § 162 (a) (1954).
c Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Partnerships,54 COL. L. REV. 183 (1954).
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ferent conclusions as would the 'courts in both the Doak7 and Morans
cases had they applied an "entity" theory and held the partners as employees of the partnership. By holding that a partner cannot be an employee of a partnership, the courts in these cases adopted the "aggregate" approach holding that a partner was merely working for himself
and could not therefore compensate himself.
I. PRIOR To INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
An analogous situation to the case of meals and lodging furnished
a partner is where the partnership agreement provides that a partner
is to receive a fixed "salary" as compensation for services in addition
to his distributive share of partnership profits.
The early case of Estate of S. U. Tilton9 in 1927 took the position
that such agreements to pay fixed "salaries" to partners were nothing
more than a method for distributing the partnership profits. The court
stated:
"A partner devoting his time and energies to the business of
the firm is in fact working for himself and can not be considered as an employee of the firm in the sense that he is in the
service of another. It follows, therefore, that he can not be paid
a salary by the firm out of earnings in the sense of compensation for services rendered to an employer. In effect any allowances drawn by a partner from partnership assets are payments
which he makes to himself and no man can be his own employer
or employee."' 10
One year later in 1928, Karl Pauli v. Commissioner" followed the
Tilton case 12 in holding that a payment of $6,000 to a partner entered
on the partnership books as "salary" was in reality advance payment
of firm profits and not compensation to the partner.
As a result of these two cases, the Tax Court appeared to establish the application of the "aggragate" theory when a "salary" was attempted to be paid a partner.
The problem of how these distributions were to be treated by
the recipient if the partnership had no profits was decided in Lloyd
v. Commissioner.3 They were to be treated as a return of capital: taxable to the extent that it represented capital of his partners and nontaxable to the extent that it represented a return of his own capital.
A number of Treasury Department rulings'14 all citing the Tilton"
Supra, note 1.

8 Supra, note 2.

98 B. T. A. 914 (1927).

10 Ibid. at 917.

1111 B. T. A. 784 (1928).
Supra, note 9.
13 15 B. T. A. 82 (1929).
14G.C.M. 2467 VI-2 C.13. 192 (1928); G.C.M. 6582 VIII-2 C.B.-200 (1929);
G.C.2f. 13771 XIII-2 C.B. 229 (1934); G.C.M. 21418, 1939-2 C.B. 249 (1939).
15 Supra, note 9.
12
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case as authority, held that such "salaries" were merely methods of
distributing partnership profits and could not be true salaries no matter what the partnership agreement specified since a partner could
not be a partnership's employee.
The application of the "aggregate" theory sometimes produced
exceedingly unrealistic results. If a partner had been an employee of
the partnership prior to his becoming a member of the partnership
and rendered precisely the same service after becoming a partner as
he had before and received the same amount of money for the performance of the service, the money suddenly was no longer compensation
to him but distribution of profits.16
If these 'salaries" did not represent compensation to the partner
under the "aggregate" theory but distribution of partnership profits
it necessarily followed, if the theory was applied consistently, that
no deduction would be allowed by the partnership as a business expense. Two Treasury rulings 17 and a Tax Court decision in 192918
refused to allow the partnership deductions for these "salaries."
This string of decisions all applying the "aggregate theory was
ignored by the Tax Court in a 1950 decision: Lief J. Sverdrup v.
Commissioner.19 This case involved an engineering partnership which
had procurred government construction contracts to be performed
outside the United States. Petitioner, a member of the partnership, spent six months outside the United States supervising construction of airfields etc. He was paid $5,000 by the partnership as
compensation for these services, in addition to his distributive share
of partnership profits. The Tax Court applied an "entity" theory, completely ignoring the precedent against its application, and held that
the $5,000 was compensation to petitioner:
"This sum was not a part of the income of the partnership
of which he was a member but was paid to him as an individual
for services rendered to his joint venture. Accordingly, it is not
to be considered as his distributive share of income.... 2
With the "salary" cases as background, the first case involving
meals and lodging was Papineau v. Commissioner21 decided one year
subsequent to the Sverdrup case. 22 The Papineau case2 3 involved essentially the same facts as the Doak and Moran decisions2 and was
Tweedy v. Commissioner, 47 B. T. A. 341 (1942).
G.C.M. 6582 VIII-2 C.B.-200 (1929), supa, note 14; G.C.M. 21418, 1939-2 C.B.
249 (1939), supra, note 14.
1' Lloyd v. Commissioner, see note 13.
19 14 T. C. 859 (1950).
20 Ibid. at 866.
21 16 T. C. 130 (1951).
22 Supra, note 19.
23 Supra, note 21.
24 Supra, notes 1 and 2.
16

'r
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relied on by the Tax Court in allowing the deduction in those cases. 5
The Tax Court in the Papineau case allowed the deduction of the
meals and lodging from the partership income although it stated:
"Partners can not be employees for the purpose of salaries
and their "salaries" are not deductible expenses of the business;
neither are the meals and lodging of a managing partner compensation for his services, the reason being that one can not
employ or compensate himself."26
The court seemed to apply the "aggregate" theory drawing the analogy between "salaries" and meals and lodging, holding that neither
could be compensation because a partner could not be an employee of
the partnership. But the court nevertheless allowed the partnership
a deduction, stating:
"His meals and lodging are a part of the ordinary and necessary expenses of operating. They are still ordinary and necessary expenses of operating even 27though this officer is the owner or one of a group of owners.1
It is difficult to reconcile the Papineau case 28 and the Doak,20 Moran3"

and "salary" cases on the "aggregate" theory. These decisions, with
the exception of the Sverdrup case, 31 applied the "aggregate" theory
in holding that a partner cannot be an employee of the partnership;
therefore the meals and lodging or "salary" could not be compensation.
Yet the Papineau3 decision allows the deduction by the partnership as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. It is difficult to see on
what theory the court can justify the granting of this deduction since it
states that the meals and lodging are not compensation. The language
of the Code section 33 allows the deduction for "salaries or other compensation for personal services" which would presumably include
services rendered by an independent contractor. But under the "aggregate" theory a partner could not be an independent contractor rendering service to the partnership any more than he can be an employee.
Under the theory he would still be working for himself and therefore
could not compensate himself either as an employee or indpendent
contractor. Although the Code section3 4 allows a deduction for business
expenses other than compensation for services such as rent, heat etc., it
is difficult to categorize this deduction as some type of expense other
than compensation for services.
25 Supra, note 3.
2G Supra, note 21 at 132.
27 Ibid., at 313.
28 Supra, note 21.
29 Supra, note 1.
30 Supra, note 2.
31 Supra, note 19.
32 Supra, note 21.
33 Supra, note 5.

34 Ibid.
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Part of the reasoning of the Papineau case 35 is consistent with the
"aggregate" theory, but the ultimate result the court comes to is more
logical under the "entity" theory. This theory would designate the
partner as an employee; the meals and lodging would be compensation
to him. The deduction then would be allowed by the partnership as
an ordinary and necessary business expense; compensation for personal services rendered. 6 The prior decisions reasoning on the "aggregate" theory are more consistent in denying the deduction by the partnershipY
Subsequent to the Papineau35 case, there have been three decisions 39 which have relied on it in allowing the deduction, two of which
have been reversed on appeal.40 In view of these reversals in the appellate courts and the Commissioner's nonacquisence 4 1 and refusal to
follow the decision in its rulings, 4 2 the case, in the opinion of the
writer, must be regarded as an anomaly.
In other appellate decisions prior to the 1954 CODE, much like the
"salary" cases in their basic facts, where the partner dealt with his
partnership as a stranger would deal with it such as rendering service
for the partnership, or using the services of the partnership the courts
failed to follow either theory consistently.
The Second Circuit in the case of Benjamin v. Hoey applying
the "aggregate" theory43 held that where a partner ran personal stock
transactions through his partnership and paid it brokerage commissions, 38% of these commissions (that percentage attributable to his
interest in the business) which were paid to him as his distributive
share of the partnership profits were excludable from his gross income because to that extent he was dealing with himself and what
one pays to himself cannot be income.
In Wegener v. Commissioner4 in the Fifth Circuit, the taxpayer
35 Supra, note 21.
36 Supra, note 5.
37 Supra, notes 1, 2, 13, 17.
38 Supra, note 21.
39 Supra, notes 3 and 4; Leo B. & Ora B. Wolfe, 1955 (P-H) TC Mem. Dec.
par. 55,198 (1955), on appeal to 4th Circuit.
40 Supra, notes 1 and 2;
The case of Briggs v. U.S., 1956 P-H Fed. Taxes Par. 72,319 (1956), while
not mentioning the Papineau decision allowed the partnership the deduction
and also excluded the value of the meals and lodging from the individual
partner's gross income. The court did not state upon what reasoning these results were based. The case was also reversed on appeal, see U.S. v. Briggs,
note 2. Because of these reversals, the probability is high that the Wolfe case,
note 39, also will be reversed.
41 C. B. 1952-2, 5, (1952).
42 Rev. Rul. 80, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 62.
43 139 F. 2d 945 (2d Cir. 1944).
This case has been cited as an example of a hybrid theory; that is, that the
partner deals with himself to the extent of his own interest in the partnership and treats the remainder as an exchange with the other partners as an
-ntitv. See 70 HARV. L. REv. 379 (1956).

44 119 F. 2d 49 (5th Cir. 1941).
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owned a one third interest in a partnership which owned gas and oil
leases. He did the drilling of the wells as would an employee or independent contractor, billed his partners for the service and was paid
by them. His contention consistent with the "aggregate" theory was
that he should not be taxed on one third of the profit received from
his partners for the drilling since he owned a third interest in the
partnership. The court applying the "entity" theory held that the entire amount was taxable since he acted as any outsider would have in
performing the service.
These conflicting theories and lack of consinstent application of
them by the courts resulted in much confusion and uncertainty necessitating a CODE revision if a partnership could act within this area with
any expectation of what the tax consequences would be.
II. PARTNERSHIP TREATMENT UNDER THE 1954 CODE
The 1954 CODE attempted to resolve this confusion by specifically
adopting the "entity" theory in transactions between a partner and
45
partnership.
Sec. 707 (a) states the rule that: if the partner engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity as a member of
such partnership, the transaction shall be treated as between the partnership and a stranger. Sec. 707 (c) states that: payments made to
a partner for services or for use of capital shall be considered as being
47
4
made to a stranger for purposes of Sec. 61 (a) " and Sec. 162 (a).
48
Sec. 707 (c) was aimed at the "salary" cases and also to those
cases where interest was paid to a partner upon contributions of capital
to the partnership.4 9 Under this section, where a partner receives a
salary under the partnership agreement, it will be treated as compensation to him and as a business deduction by the partnership. This
would seem to be a more realistic and practical approach than the decisions under the "aggregate" theory prior to the 1954 CODE and to be
more consistent with the intent of the parties. This section would
probably not help in a case involving meals and lodging because it
would be hard to classify meals and lodging as a guaranteed payment
in view of the wording of the CODE section,50 the House Committee
52
Reports, 51 and Treasury Regulations.
45

H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954).

46 Relating to gross income.

17 Supra, note 5.

48 Supra, note 45 at 68, A226.
49

These interest payments had been previously held to be distribution of partnership profits and nondeductible by the partnership. See Ella Daly King v.
Commissiner, 10 B. T. A. 698 (1928) ; John A. L. Blake v. Commissioner,
9 B. T. A. 651 (1927).
50
INT. REV. CODE § 707 (c).
51 Supra, note 48.

52 Treas. Regs. § 1.707-1 (c).
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The House Committee in adopting Sec. 707 (a) stated what transactions should be included within the category of a transaction where
the partner is acting other than in his capacity as a partner:
"Such transactions include the sale of property by the partner
to the partnership, the purchase of property by the partner from
the partnership and the rendering
of services for pay by the part53
ner to the partnership."
The Treasury's regulations covering this section generally follow
those items contained in the committee reports:
"Such transactions include for example, loans of money or
property by the partnership to the partner or by the partner to
the partnership, the sale of property by the partner to the partnership, the purchase of property by the partner from the partnership, and the rendering of services by the '54
partnership to the
partner or by the partner to the partnership.
It is to be noted that the words "for pay" in the Committee Report are omitted from the regulation in stating the last category: rendering of services by the partner to the partnership. Under this broad
language of the regulation, a case involving meals and lodging furnished a partner would most likely be decided according to the "entity" theory and the partner treated as one not a partner under Sec.
707 (a), i.e. as an employee of the partnership. Under such classification the meals and lodging would represent compensation to the partner.
What would be the tax consequences under the 1954 CODE if partners receiving meals and lodging by the partnership are classified as
employees under Sec. 707 (a) and the meals and lodging as compensation? Prior to the 1954 CODE the Commissioner had a regulation which
provided:
"If a person receives as compensation for services rendered
a salary and in addition thereto living quarters or meals, the
value to such person of the quarters and meals so furnished
constitutes income subject to tax. If however, living quarters or
meals are furnished to employees for the convenience of the employer, the value thereof need not be computed and added to the
compensation otherwise received by the employees." 55
If the meals and lodging were found to be compensation under this
regulation they were includable in the employee's gross income even
if furnished for the convenience of the employer. The "convenience
of employer" rule was used as an administrative test to be applied
only in cases in which the compensatory character of the benefit was
not otherwise determinable. 6
5 Supra, note 45 at A226.
54Treas. Regs.§ 1.707-1 (a).
5 Treas. Regs. 118, § 39.22 (a)-3.
5c Mim. 6472, CB 1950-1, 15 (1950).
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Under Sec. 119 of the 1954 CODE the "convenience of the employer"
rule is the primary test. 7 If the meals and lodging are furnished for
the "convenience of the employer" and meet the other qualifications
of the section,58 the employee may exclude them from his gross income
even if they represent compensation to him.
Under the former regulation, whenever the meals and lodging were
found to be compensatory, the employee would include their value in
gross income, and the employer would take a corresponding deduction
as a business expense. However under Sec. 119 there is not necessarily
a correlation between a deduction by the employer and inclusion by
the employee. If the meals and lodging are compensation to the employee and qualify under Sec. 119, their value would be wholly deductible by the employer as a business expense 9 and at the same time
be completely excluded from the employee's gross income.60
In a situation where partners are furnished meals and lodging and
found to be strangers and hence employees in their rendering of service to the partnership under the provisions of Sec. 707 (a), Sec. 119
might operate to exclude the value of the meals and lodging from the
partner's gross income. Since the value of the meals and lodging would
also be compensation paid out by the partnership, the partnership would
also deduct the value as a business expense in arriving at partnership
61
net income.
This combination of Sec. 119 and Sec. 707 (a) would allow the
partner a double deduction to the extent that the value of the meals
and lodging are deducted from partnership gross income in figuring
his distributive share of profits. The fact that in reality the partner
and the partnership may be the same person, even if the "entity" theory
is used as a legal concept of a partnership, allows Sec. 119 to enable the
partner to completely avoid the taxability of the meals and lodging by
excluding their value from his gross income, and at the same time to
use them to reduce the size of his distributive share of the partnership profits.
III. CONCLUSION

The incorporation of the "entity" theory into the Code by Sec. 707
should impart definiteness and consistency to an area previously
marred by conflicting opinions as to which theory was to be applied.
The adoption of the "entity" theory in preference to the "aggregate"
theory is desirable. The theory is simpler in operation, is more realistic,
.5 Sen.

Rep. No. 1622, 83rd. Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1954).

58 (1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises

of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging
on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.

59 Supra, note 5.
60 2 Mertens, Law of FederalIncome Taxation §11.16 (1955).

61 Supra, note

5.

84
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and will conform in most cases to the actual intent of the participating
members.
Because of the dual nature of the partnership, the operation of
Sec. 119 may create some degree of tax avoidance by the recipient
of the meals and lodging, but the general desirability of the "entity
theory" should outweigh the small amount of revenue that would be
lost.
MICHAEL

J.

PELTIN

